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so modified, the judgment is affirmed. Defendants and crosscomplainants Vaughan will recover their costs on appeal.
Gibson, C. J ., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J ., Carter, J., and
Traynor, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-Upon the grounds stated by
the District Court of Appeal in an opinion authored by the
late Justice Wilson and concurred in by Presiding Justice
Moore and Justice McComb (reported at 237 P.2d 53) I
would reverse the judgment.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied August
7, 1952. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

[L. A. No. 22232. In Bank. July 11, 1952.]

FASCINATION, INCORPORATED (a Corporation), Respondent, v. EDWARD G. HOOVER et al., Appellants.
[1] License&--Compelling Issuanc&--Evidence.-In mandamus proceeding to compel city tax collector, chief of police and city
prosecutor to issue license to petitioner to operate an amusement game, it is error to admit evidence on the question of
whether the game is one of skill or chance; the applicant is
not entitled to a trial de novo on this question since authority
to decide it is vested in the local administrative officers.
[2] !d.-Compelling Issuance-Scope of Inquiry.-In mandamus
proceeding to compel local administrative officers to issue
license to petitioner to operate an amusement game, the trial
court is limited to an examination of the matters considered
and examined by the officers in arriving at their decision; to
an ascertainment of whether such matters were sufficient to
justify denY"in:g the license. .
'[3a, Sb] Administrative Law-Court Review-Hearing-Trial de
. Novo.-where determinative powers ~e vested in a local ad' minlstrative
agency and the court finds its decision lacks
..
[1] See Ca.l.Jur., Licenses, § 58; Am.Jur., M;andamus, § 184 et seq.
· [3]- See Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 233; Am.Jur., Public Administrative Law, § 223.
McK. . Dig.. References: [1] Licenses, § 34(4); [2] Licenses,
§. 34(5); ,'[~] --Adininistrative Law, . § 22; [4] Licenses, § 34(6);
[5] Administrative Law, § 8.
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evidentiary basis, a hearing was denied or it was otherwise
erroneous, it is proper procedure to remand the case to the
local agency for further and proper proceedings rather than
for the court to decide the matter on the merits.
[ 4] Licenses-Compelling Issuance-Appeal-Prejudicial Error.In mandamus proceeding to compel local administrative officers to issue license to petitioner to operate 8.II: amusement
game, error in admitting evidence on question of whether
game is one of skill or chance is prejudicial where it is doubtful whether the evidence in the case sustains the court's finding that the officers had insufficient basis for their denial
of the license, that the game is one of chance, and where
the record demonstrates that the court's judgment granting
the writ was based to a considerable extent on the inadmissible evidence.
[6] Administrative Law- Proceedings- Notice. and Hearing.Where a city ordinance provides that when an application for
a license is made to the tax collector he must refer it to
designated officers so that it may be "ascertained" whether
or not the proposed business would "comply with applicable
laws and ordinances," it is contemplated that a factual or
mixed factual and legal determination shall be made by the
officers which is characteristic in the exercise · of a quasi
judicial function, and the applicant is entitled to notice and
hearing of the application so that he may present competent
evidence for consideration by the officers.

APPEAL from a. judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Albert F. Ross, Judge.• Reversed.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel issuance of license to
conduct an amusement business. Judgment granting writ
reversed.
Irving M. Smith, City Attorney (Long Beach), Philip J.
Brady and John R. Nimocks, Deputy City Attorneys, for
Appellants.
Fred N. Howser for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Defendants appeal from a. judgment granting a. writ of mandate commanding them to issue a. license
to plaintiff, a corporation, to conduct a.n amusement busi[5] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, §§ 1051 116; Am.Jur.,
Public Administrative Law, §§ 119, 134.
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial CounciL
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ness consisting of a game called ''fascination'' in the city
of Long Beach. Defendants are Hoover, the city tax collector, Dovey, chief of police, and Sutherland, city prosecutor.
There are certain ordinances of the City of Long Beach
covering the issuance of licenses to operate amusement games
and other businesses. It appears that before a person may
engage in business in said city he must obtain a license
therefor from the city tax collector and pay certain fees;
if he operates the business without a license he is guilty
of a misdemeanor. In order to obtain a license he must
submit with his application "such information as the tax
collector may reasonably require.'' Under section 6.100 of
Ordinance C-2232 the collector ''shall thereupon refer suqh
application to the appropriate departments of the city government in order that it may be ascertained whether or not
the business proposed to be conducted or the premises in
which it is proposed to be conducted or the premises in
which it is proposed to locate such business, will comply with
applicable laws and ordinances. Upon receipt of written
notice from such departments that such business and the
location at which it is proposed to conduct the same will
so comply, it shall be the duty of the tax collector to prepare and issue a license to the person making application
therefor upon the payment of the proper fees. In the event
that a particular department of the city government shall
reject an application for the reason that such business or
the location at which it is proposed to conduct the same will
not so comply with applicable laws and ordinances, the tax
collector shall not issue such license. If, at the time of making application therefor, any money has been paid in excess
of that required for the expense of conducting an inspection
by the city, the city council shall, anything herein to the
contrary notwithstanding, authorize the making of a refund
to the applicant of such excess, upon receipt from the tax
collector of information that such application has been rejected."
In compliance with the foregoing ordinance, plaintiff, on
April 10, 1951, filed an application for a license to conduct
an amusement business at a specified place and accompanied
it with a description of the game to be operated. Each
player is seated at a table and supplied with a ball which
he endeavors to roll up a slope into holes in the table in
front of him, with the aim of dropping balls in five holes
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in a row. The ball then returns to him. The player who
first achieves that goal is the winner. He receives merchandise, replay coupons or merchandise certificates.
The chief of police, Dovey, and city prosecutor, Sutherland, were the appropriate officials to which the application
should be submitted under section 6.100 to ascertain whether
the business would violate any law and the tax collector
submitted plainti1i's application to them. After an investigation by those officers (further discussed later herein) they
found and recommended to the tax collector that the game
would constitute a violation of ''certain sections'' of the
state Penal Code. Accordingly, the tax collector denied plaintiff's application on May 29, 1951.
Thereafter, plaintiff commenced this action for a writ of
mandate to compel the issuance of a license to operate the
business charging that Fascination is a game of skill rather
than of chance and violates no laws; and that Dovey and
Sutherland "studied and considered" the game but acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the application. Defendants' answer denied the pertinent allegatiqns of the
complaint. The trial court found that the game was intended to be one of skill, not chance, and that defendants
acted arbitrarily, making only a cursory examination of the
game and without substantial evidence. Accordingly, judgment was entered directing the issuance of the writ and the
appeal now considered was taken therefrom by defendants.
At the opening of the trial plainti1i took the position that
evidence as to whether the game was one of chance or skill
should be received. Defendants asserted that the only admissible evidence was the extent and nature of the investigation made by them to ascertain whether they had acted
reasonably and on sufficient grounds in denying the application. The court agreed with plaintiff and evidence pro
and con as to whether the game was one of skill or chance
was admitted.
On the issue of the investigation by defendants, Dovey
testified that plaintiff's secretary, Gibbs, wanted Dovey and
Sutherland to examine the game on May 3, 1951. They, accompanied by Rope, an investigator from Sutherland's office,
three police officers, and the city electrician, went to where
the game was being erected. They were there about an hour
and a half examining the game. Dovey and the others, except
the electrician, played the game. Dovey rolled 30 balls, the
others rolled many more. The equipment was inspected. The
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game was demonstrated by Gibbs and Dovey concluded it
was a game of chance from "going it" himself and Gibbs'
statement that he could not successfully operate it with the
chevron out. (The chevron is a V-shaped protuberance on
the table immediately in front of the ball receiving holes
and the ball must be rolled over it.) He tried to make the
ball go into certain holes. His test as to whether the game
could be characterized as one of skill or chance depended
on which predominated. The chevron made it impossible to
control the course of the ball. The police officers told him
it was a game of chance. Sutherland testified substantially
to the same effect and also that he submitted a game exactly
similar to a university professor. Gibbs testified that at the
May 3d inspection he told them it was a game of skill; that
the chevron made it more so ; that by the exercise of skill
the ball could be made to drop in a chosen hole ; that the
investigation took less than an hour; that Dovey and Suther·land 'rolled the ball seven or eight times; and that he was
permitted to show them anything he wished about the game.
As before stated most of the record consists of evidence
on the question of whether or not the game was one of skill
or chance. Defendants contend that the admission of that
evidence was error, their position being that the only evidence admissible was what was done and considered by
Dovey and Sutherland in determining that question; that
the :finding that they acted arbitrarily is not supported by
the evidence ; and that in any event the matter should have
been remanded to the officers to conduct a further and proper
investigation if the one had was insufficient.
[1] Putting aside for the moment the question of whether
or not a notice ·a nd hearing in the traditional sense must be
accorded the applicant for a license, it is clear that it was
error to admit evidence in the trial court on the question
of whether the game was one of skill or chance. Whether
or not a notice and hearing is required, the applicant was
not entitled to a trial de novo on the question inasmuch
as we are dealing with a local administrative agency or officers. The authority to decide the question was vested in
those officers. [2] The trial court is limited to an examination of the matters considered and examined by the officers in arriving at their decision; to an ascertainment of
whether such matters were slifficient to justify denying the
license. (Bank of America v. Mundo, 37 Cal.2d 1 [229 P.2d
345] ; Nishkian v. City of Long Beach, 103 Cal.App.2d 749
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[230 P.2d 156]; Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Cal.2d 610 [184 P.2d
879]; Universal Consol. Oil Co. v. Byram, 25 Ca:l.2d 353
[153 P.2d 746]; Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. County of
Los Angeles, 162 Cal. 164 [121 P. 384]; Hammond Lbr. Co.
v. County of Los Angeles, 104 Cal.App. 235 [285 P. 896];
La Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal.2d 47
[162 P.2d 13]; ·cantren v. Board of Supervisors, 87 Cal.App.
2d 471 [197 P.2d 218]; see Southern Cal. Jockey Club,
Inc.
Californ~ Etc. Racing Board, 36 Cai.2d 167 [223
P .2d 1] .)
Plaintiff cites Saks & Co. v. City of Beverly Hills, 107
Cal.App.2d 260 [237 P.2d 32], where the attack was on
revocation of a zoning ordinance variance by a city council,
and the court ·said that where there is pleading and proof
that a local board acted arbitrarily, capriciously or fraudulently, the superior court will afford petitioner a trial de
novo. If tl).at means that such a trial may be granted where
the question presented is the precise one the local agency
had authority to decide and did decide, it is contrary to the
foregoing authorities and must be disapproved. In Mitchell
v. Morris, 94 Cal.App.2d 446 [210 P.2d 857], a permit to
erect a residence on a lot was denied because of lack of
access. The sole question there presented was the constitUtionality of 't he ordinance, and the' statement that the
property owner must prove in court that his lot had ade~uate access in order to show, the city agency's action was
arbitrary, is dictum. What the court meant was, that plaintiff must show th~t the agency had no basis for the denial
of the permit wliich embr11ced the conclusion that the access
was adequate. The primary point involved in the Saks case
was whether a hearing was accorded petitioner. [Sa] But
i:ri' ~ case' where a hearing is required and none is had, the
proper procedure, as will be discussed later herein, is to
remand the case to tlie local agency with directions to afford
petitioner a hearing rather than a trial de novo. The true
rule With respect to this problem was stated by this court
in Bank of' America v. Mundo, supra, 37 Cal.2d 1, 5: "The
question presente-d to the superior court in such an action
is whether there was evidence of sufficient substantiality before the board to justify the :finding . . . and in the absence
of fraud or malicious or arbitrary use of its powers the board
is the· sole judge of questions of fact and of the values of
property." That may mean in one sense that where there
is no foundation fer the· agency's determination of the issue

v.
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it is authorized to decide, its determination will be annulled
because it is capricious and arbitrary; the court, however,
is confined to the matters considered by the agency. In another sense it means that evidence may be introduced in court
showing matters outside those before the agency when the
record of the proceeding before the agency will not show
such conduct on its part, such as fraud, or the denial of
a proper hearing, if a hearing is required, etc. In those
instances it must be contended that the agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, fraudulently or maliciously. Even in
those instances it may be necessary for the aggrieved person
to present, if he can, such claims to the agency and make
a record there, but we do not decide that question here. In
the case at bar the precise issue, whether it be denominated
law or fact or a mixture of the two, which the officers had ,
the authority to determine, was whether plaintiff's proposed business would violate the law-whether it proposed
to operate a game of chance. The evidence admitted at the
trial was aimed at that same question, an issue upon which
a trial de novo could not be had. Plaintiff and the trial court
seemed to think that it could not be determined by the court
whether the action by the officials was arbitrary or capricious \
unless the court took evidence on the issue decided by the
officials. That view is wholly out of harmony with the principles heretofore enumerated. If it were accepted there
could be a trial de novo in every case. It would be the same
as if on a review of a record on appeal on the ground of
insufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's findings, the appellate court would receive evidence to ascertain
whether the trial court acted arbitrarily, without sufficient
evidence.
[4] Defendants assert, however, that the error, if any,
was not prejudicial. It clearly was. As seen from the foregoing discussion of the facts it is quite doubtful that the
evidence is sufficient to support the court's finding that the
officers had insufficient basis for their denial of the license,
that the game was one of chance. In view of the result
reached herein it is not necessary to pass upon that point.
At the outset of the trial and several times thereafter
when a discussion arose between counsel and court as to the
admissibility of evidence on whether the game was one of
chance, the court expressed the view hereinabove stated to
be erroneous, that is, that such evidence was admissible to
ascertain if the officers acted arbitrarily. For illustration,
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when, at the beginning of the trial, the scope of the evidence was under discussion the trial court said : ' ' There is
not much question about the general principle of law but
it seems to me in a case like this, you do have to take evidence about the merits, although you are not trying an issue.
It is not a trial de novo, but trying the issues whether or
not the officers of the board used their discretion arbitrarily.
You almost have to see what the facts are about the issues
they decided; not that you can substitute yours for them,
if they made an honest determination. You may not agree
with them but if you see that they could have reasonably
come to the conclusion, then you had better let it stand, but
it would be the same thing for instance on a license that
· should not be issued to anyone under twenty-one years of
age, and the board refused on the ground that he was under
twenty-one, that was their reason, and you come in here
and they could show they made an investigation and following their investigation, they showed that he was under twentyone, but if the other side wanted to produce evidence, they
could show that he was over twenty-one. I think that evidence should be in, in answer to the other side, and whether
they would have changed their idea or decision if it was
known.'' Similar remarks were made on other occasions
and finally in its "Memorandum of Decision" the court said:
''The question as to whether the game is .actually one of
chance or skill, i.e., whether chance or skill predominates,
is not a direct issue in this case. However I admitted evidence of the nature of the game, including that of the two
experts who testified on opposing sides, as I feel that, in
determining whether a sufficient hearing or investigation was
had before the administrative decision was arrived at, not
only the testimony of the expert relied on would be relevant,
but also the testimony of other experts which might have
been available to the investigators. Were handwriting an
issue before an administrative agency and were it determined
on the testimony of a bank teller who said it was that of
a certain person, should not a reviewing court admit testimony of a Clark Sellers that the writing was not of that
person in determining whether the evidence of the bank teller
was substantial enough to support the decision of the administrative agency T It was for this limited purpose that
the evidence of the experts was admitted herein. . . .
"For this reason I feel that the decision of the Chief of
Police and the City Prosecutor was not at the time based on ·
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substantial evidence but, to that extent, was arbitrary. Their
determination that chance predominates in this game may
be right, in which case the penal laws are effectj.ve regardless of city license, particularly 335a Penal Cod~, and this
is true as to Lite-0-Line and the other games which are no
less games of chance than Fascination. If one is such, all
are. (This does not apply to target shooting, throwing balls
at bottles, or darts at balloons, ·etc.)." While that memorandum cannot control the findings of the court (it did not
find whether the game was one of chance but did find the
officers acted without sufficient basis), and it is ordinarily
presumed that in a trial by the court without a jury the
court based its findings only upon admissible evidence, the
record demonstrates that the court's judgment was based to
a considerable extent, if not chiefly, on the inadmissible evidence. Hence, the error was prejudicial.
The judgment must, therefore, be reversed but to avoid
the possibility of error in disposing of the case on retrial,
more must be said. There are two important questions remaining: (1) Whether plaintiff was entitled to a formal notice
and hearing of its application for a license before the officers, and (2) if it was, but such hearing was not afforded,
or, if it was not, and it is found that the officers had no
sound basis for their determination, should the judgment of
the court be to remand the matter to the officers or an order ·
for the issuance of the license 7
[3b] On the second question it is settled that where determinative powers are vested in a local administrative age:J;J.cy
and the court finds its decision lacks evidentiary basis, a hearing was denied or it was otherwise erroneous, it is proper
procedure to remand the matter to the agency .for .further
and proper proceedings rather than for the court to decide
the matter on the merits. (See Cason v. Glass .Bottle Blowers
Assn., 37 CaL2d 134 [231 P .2d 6]; English v. City of Long
Beach, 35 Cal.2d 155 [217 P.2d 22, 18 A.L.R.2d 547]; Steen
v. City of Los .Angeles, 31 Cal.2d 542 [190 P.2d 937}; La
Prade v. Department of Water & Power, supra, 27 Cal.2d
47; Martin v. Board, of Supervisors, 135 Cal.App. 96 [26
P .2d 843].) Plaintiff claims, ·however, that the officers were
biased and prejudiced and it cannot obtain a . .fair and impartial decision from them. There is no finding to that effect,
nor were they so .c harged in the complaint. Indeed the trial
court in its opinion states its b~lief that they acted honestly
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and "in good :faith. It is not, therefore, a matter which will
rtow be determined.
[5] Under the circumstances presented a notice and hearing were required. It will be recalled that section 6.100
of the ordinance provides that when an application for a
license is made to the tax collector he must refer it to designated officers in order that it may be 11 ascertained" whether
or ·not the proposed business would "comply with applicable
laws and ordinances.'' If such officers give written notice
to the collector that it will comply he must issue the license.
If the officers reject the application because the business
would violate the law the collector shall not issue the li~ense.
In other words, the license must be granted unless there
is found cause :for its denial. Manifestly it is contemplated
that a factual or mixed factual and legal determination shall
be made by the officers which is characteristic
the exercise of a quasi judicial function. Marliln v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 135 Cal.App. 96, is clearly analogous. There
the county ordinance regulating the sale of beverages containing above a certain percentage of alcohol, designated the
board of supervisors as the licensing board for the issuance
of licenses to sell beverages. A person desiring a license
should apply in writing to the board giving such information as the board prescribed. Upon receipt of the application the board shall "investigate" and deny such application i:f the applicant and the premises to be used :for his
business would not conform to specified conditions. Plaintiff
filed an application for a license which was denied by the
board without notice or hearing. On mandamus the court
directed the board to afford plaintiff a hearing, stating (p.
100): "When a board of supervisors is charged by law with
the duty of issuing licenses upon specified terms and conditions, that tribunal becomes a quasi-judicial body for determining the facts aJ;id exercising sound and reasonable discretion in the performance of its duty. Since a board of
supervisors is only a quasi-judicial body in its investigation
and determination of the merits of petitions for licenses
in conformity with the provisions of an ordinance, its hearings may be somewhat informal and need not conform in all
respects to the solemnity of a court proceeding. Nevertheless, the law does contemplate a fair and impartial hearing
of an application :for a license with an opportunity for the
petitione~ to present competent evidence for the consideration of the board. (Reed v. · OoZlins, 5 Cal.App. 494 [~0 P.

m
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973]; 33 C.J. 548, §§ 138-141.) By the great weight of
authority, as appears from the text in 33 C.J., at page 548 :
'One who has made an application for license is entitled
to a hearing by the licensing authority.' On page 549 of
the same volume it is further said: 'Where the hearing on
an application for a license is held before a court, or before
a board which acts in a judicial capacity, the proceedings
are in the nature of a civil action and are governed by the
ordinary rules of judicial procedure applicable thereto.' . . .
It is true that an individual has no vested right to engage
in the business of selling intoxicating liquor. (Ritz v. Lightston, 10 Cal.App. 685, 689 [103 P. 363] .) The regulation of
that business is governed by legal principles different from
those which apply to what may be termed inherently lawful
avocations. While it is contended the ordinance which is
involved in this proceeding purports to license only nonintoxicating beverages, we are satisfied the interpretation of this
act should be governed by the same rules which apply to
the regulation of intoxicating drinks. A court may not take
judicial notice of just what percentage of alcohol mingled
with beer, ale or wine will necessarily intoxicate a particular
individual, or just what quantity of the beverage will have
that effect. (33 C.J. 498, sec. 17.) ... In spite of the fact
that a vested right to engage in dispensing of these beverages
may not exist, still the law contemplates a fair and impartial
hearing of any application for a license which has been filed
in strict conformity with the law. . .. It would be preposterous to concede that any judicial tribunal could be
clothed with the arbitrary power of issuing licenses and
regulating business subject only to its own caprice; that
with or without a hearing on the merits of the application,
with or without reason, or upon ex parte statements or rumors,
with no opportunity of refuting them, the board could grant
or deny a petition for license. This is not the purpose or
spirit with which regulatory statutes are enacted. Law contemplates justice whether it is granted as a privilege or recognized as a vested right. We therefore conclude that the
right to engage in the sale of beverages under the ordinance
of Lake County may not be arbitrarily denied by the Board
of Supervisors without a hearing or an opportunity on the
part of the petitioner to present the merits of her application to the licensing tribunal." (See Reed v. Collins, 5 Cal.
App. 494 [90 P. 973].) The Martin case has been cited
with approval in cases involving the revocation of a license.
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(People v. Noggle, 7 Cal.App.2d 14, 20 [45 P.2d 430]; CarroU v. California Horse Radtng Board, 16 Cal.2d 164 [105
P.2d 110] ; Irvine v. State Board of Equalization, 40 Cal.
App.2d 280, 285 [104 P.2d 847] ; Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v.
Santa Barbara, 85 Cal.App.2d 776, 797 [194 P.2d 148] .)
And it has been held that unless the statute expressly pro~ides to the contrary a license cannot be revoked without a
hearing where the statute contemplates a quasi judicial determination by the administrative agency that there be cause
for the revocation; that because of reasons of justice and
policy the statute will be interpreted to require a hearing.
(Ratliff v. Lampton, 32 Cal.2d 226 [195 P.2d 792, 10 A.L.R.
2d 826]; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, supra,
16 Cal.2d 164; La Prade v. Department of Water & Power,
supra, 27 Cal.2d 47; Covert v. State Board of Equalization,
29 Cal.2d 125 [173 P.2d 545]; Steen v. Board of Cilvil Service
Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716 [160 P.2d 816] ; Bannerman v. Boyle,
160 Cal. 197 [116 P. 732]; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [119
P. 1080] ; Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc. v. Francis, 79 Cal.
App. 383 [249 P. 539].) Other cases are in line with ,such
statutory construction. (See, also, Lloyd Sabaudo Societa
Anonima v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 336-337 [53 S.Ct. 167, 77
L.Ed. 341] ; Corcoran v. Board of Aldermen of Cambridge,
199 Mass. 5 [85 N.E. 155, 18 L.R.A.N.S. 187].)
Reliance is placed on McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal.2d
741 [91 P.2d 1035, 123 A.L.R. 1205], where it was said that
the Constitution does not require a hearing of an application for a permit to engage in the bail bond business. Here,
however, we are dealing with the interpretation of an ordinance, not constitutional law. Mor'eover, in the McDonough
case a hearing was afforded.
There is some indication from the record that the visit
to plaintiff's prospective place of business and the events
that transpired there constituted a hearing or that a full
hearing was waived. These are issues that will have to be
ascertained on retrial.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.

